Canonization of Two Popes

Do they deserve it? Continue reading

Two popes will be canonized on Sunday, John XXIII and John Paul II. Maureen Dowd has recently written in the New York Times that there was only one halo between them, and it belonged to John XXIII. She objected to the way that John Paul handled the numerous scandals caused by abusive priests. Particularly offensive to her were the ways that he dealt with Cardinal Law and the unbelievable story of Marcial Maciel Degollado. Dowd argues that these shortcomings outweigh the good that the pope did in other areas, most especially his role in the overthrow of the Communist regimes in eastern Europe.

If you take the question seriously, and she almost certainly does, the first issue must certainly be establishing criteria for evaluating a pope’s determination that someone is worthy of canonization. The theory behind this (and much of Catholic doctrine) is entirely based on two verses in the Gospel of Matthew. The pope, as the successor to St. Peter, has the Keys to the Kingdom. If he says that someone is in heaven, then that person is there. Live with it.

It is therefore clearly heretical for Dowd to claim that Pope Francis is wrong in canonizing John Paul II. I have not read about anyone calling her a heretic, but it seems obvious to me that an article entitled “A Saint He Ain’t” puts her in the camp of Jan Hus and Giordano Bruno, and the last thing that entered their nostrils was the stench of their own burning flesh.

One could, of course, consider this from the perspective of a historian of the Church. Did these two popes do an outstanding job of promulgating the Church’s message and advancing its principles? That seems to be the approach that Dowd took, but many Catholics would think that she has it backward. To them John XXIII took the first steps on the Church’s disastrous journey to becoming a more humanistic and less dogmatic institution. John Paul II, on the other hand, stood up to the Commies and helped restore respect for the traditions and doctrines throughout the world.

There are several other ways of looking at this. The first is to compare these decisions with the canonizations of other popes. Only three popes who served since the eleventh century have been canonized, and they had almost nothing in common. It is therefore not easy to make intelligent comparisons, but I feel confident that the historical record indicates that the recent popes seem at least as saintly as the previous trio. I made that case here.

Another approach is to judge the popes by the standards of Church history. How closely Pope John Paul was involved in decisions to cover up the clerical abuse cases is not clear. I would argue that even if he personally decided to stonewall on the issue, that was consistent with Church principles and the actions of previous pontiffs.

In the first place one should bear in mind that the most basic Catholic doctrine concerns forgiveness and redemption through the sacraments. Even the most serious sins can be forgiven, and even the most incorrigible offender can be given a second chance. The most outrageous pope of all time, the first John XXIII, was, after being convicted of five serious felonies, eventually welcomed back into the Church and was even restored to the rank of cardinal. The most serious crime in the Church’s eye is not murder or rape. It is heresy because the heretic is actively recruiting others to reject the Church’s teaching. He (or in this case she) is actively trying to deceive others with the expressed intent of denying them access to the means of achieving salvation. The Inquisition was specifically convened to exterminate these people and their ideas.

So, while no pope* would condone pedophilia, a person who commits pedophilia is just an ordinary sinner. All people are sinners, and the way that the Church deals with known sinners has been consistent throughout its history. If they show contrition and have “a firm purpose of amendment,” they are forgiven. They are probably counseled to pray for sanctifying grace and to avoid “near occasions of sin.” The same rule applies to children who disrespect their parents and to serial killers and rapists like the first Pope John XXIII.

Furthermore, priests are special people. They alone have received the sacrament of Holy Orders. The Church has always preached that this confers upon them divine grace that empowers them both to administer the sacraments, the only path to redemption, and to spread the Church’s message. These men have always been considered a valuable resource that is to be husbanded.

In this context it is perfectly reasonable for Church officials to keep quiet about the foibles of one of its priests, all of whom, after all, are sinners. It is perfectly reasonable to expect the officials, assuming that the offenders repented and seemed sincere, to forgive the abusive priests and to try to help them with their problem by moving them away from temptation.

How many times should you do this before you consider them beyond the pale? The Bible says that the answer is 490 (Matthew 18:22)! I have not heard of even one priest who approached the biblical limit on forgiveness.

And what of mental illness? Aren’t the pedophiles sick? I don’t know, but this way of looking at things is not consistent with Church teachings. The fact that some people are more strongly drawn to one type of sin or another is not really germane. We all must struggle with the temptations that come our way.

Of course, the Church’s approach does not consider the rights of the victims. From its perspective, however, we are all mistreated in one way or another. Our job is to “offer it up,” forgive the sinner, and to try to use the experience as a way to increase our own resolve. I don’t remember anything in the catechism about hiring a lawyer to sue the Church for millions of dollars.

* * *
In sum, I have no idea whether either pope is actually in heaven. I think that they are both admirable men. If neither is in heaven, I don’t want to go there either. I do want to go to Africa to see the animals, and I hope to visit Italy several more times.


* Well, maybe one. Pope Julius III had a very strange relationship with an adolescent ironically named Innocenzo.

Flanneried Up Beyond All Recognition

For once a happy ending. Continue reading

Two of my partners like to play the Flannery convention, which uses an artificial 2 bid to describe a hand with five hearts, four spades, and between eleven and fifteen high-card points.

On Tuesday my partner and I did not play particularly well, but we were able to take advantage of both numerous unforced errors by our opponents and the fact that most of the best players in the club were in Dallas playing for the Vanderbilt Cup. Going into the last of the twenty-seven hands I suspected that we would probably be in contention for first overall out of the forty teams that were competing.

With only the opponents vulnerable, my partner dealt and opened 2. RHO quickly passed. I was looking at these cards:

___    A 10 7 6 3 2    Q 8 6 3    10 3 2

I actually had my finger on the 4 card when my guardian angel whispered the word “Flannery” in my ear. I muttered the word “oops” and belatedly alerted partner’s bid both verbally and with the card. RHO confirmed his pass.

There really was no choice about what to bid. I set down the 4 card. The opponents probably held the majority of the high cards, but my hand had tremendous playing strength in hearts.

LHO did not ask what the bid meant either. Instead he bid 4, which my partner promptly doubled, and RHO passed.

I had learned the hard way that it was seldom correct to bid five over four. As everyone has heard, “the five-level belongs to the opponent.” But with six hearts and no spades, I had to consider pulling to 5. I knew with perfect certainty that the opponents had nine spades, and we had eleven hearts. If we could make exactly four hearts, which my seven-loser hand made a reasonable assumption, the LAW says that they should be able to garner ten tricks in spades. If so, I should bid 5.

On the other hand if partner’s values were concentrated in spades, I might lose four tricks in the minors before I could even get in. It was also possible that I had a heart loser. In addition, I must admit that it occurred to me that my partner would not be pleased if I bid when he had the spade contract set in his hand. Winning the post mortem is at least as important as winning the event. Therefore, I passed, and so did LHO.

Partner led the 8. This was the dummy:
8 7 3    Q 5    A K 9 7 4    Q 8 6

Eleven points was more than I expected. Partner must have had a minimum with a concentration of values in spades. LHO was obviously going to ruff the first trick, but there was nothing to be lost by putting up the ace. Partner obviously had the king hovering over the dummy’s lady.

But wait. LHO did not ruff. He played the four. How could that be? I checked my heart holding. I had five left, and they were definitely all hearts. Partner must have had a diamond mixed in with his hearts! I would need to be careful that he does not revoke on a diamond trick. I led back another heart, and this time declarer did ruff. Partner followed with the nine.

Eventually my partner got a club and made all of his spades good. We set them four tricks for 1100. Did you do the arithmetic? We took one club, one heart, and five spades. And there is more. Not only did partner not have a Flannery distribution, his point count was out of the Flannery range. Here is what he had:

A K J 6 4    K J 9 8    J 2    K 7

Four things to note:

  1. I thank my lucky stars that I did not bid 5. I can only make it if LHO leads a spade, and I have the audacity to finesse for the queen.
  2. I do not know what LHO was smoking to venture 4 with only seven points and such a ragged suit.
  3. The LAW actually predicted the results pretty well. We only have ten trump, and the opponents have eight. One reason that they cannot make any spades is that clubs is their best suit! Even so, there are only seventeen tricks available because my partner’s spade suit is more valuable on defense.
  4. As always, it is better to be lucky than good.

Dumb Luck Slam

Seven trumps and 29 points. Continue reading

This hand verified the old saying that it is always better to be lucky than good. I was sitting West in a pairs game, and we were vulnerable. After North’s pass my partner opened with a club. Holding the following array, I figured that we probably had game.

A K J     A Q 9 7     10 9 8 6 4     5

Faced with the choice between hearts and diamonds, I chose 1. I expected to bid diamonds on the next round. My partner, however, gave me a raise to 2, and I signed off in 4. To my shock, he waited a few seconds before proffering the 6 card. What in the world could he have? Maybe he discovered that his doubleton in diamonds was actually a second heart suit. I have done that.

I waited anxiously as North decided on a lead. Her choice was the K. This was what I saw in dummy.

7     K Q 3     A J 7     A J 10 9 6 2

Well, this should be easy. We are only missing six trumps, the Q, and KQ combinations in both minors. What could possibly go wrong?

My approach was ill-conceived, but it worked. I took the first trick and immediately finessed the spade, which worked. I dropped dummy’s two diamond losers on my ace and king of spades. I then drew two rounds of trumps in the dummy and then led the J. North took it with her queen and returned a trump, which allowed me to claim the rest: three spades, four hearts, one diamond, and four clubs. In actual fact, I ended up ruffing a good club on the thirteenth trick. Maybe we were underbid.

The reason why this was a poor approach was that North could have ruined me by simply leading a diamond back. I was lucky that she held K5, not an attractive holding from which to lead.

This is how I should have approached the hand:

  • Do I need to make this, or will down one be an acceptable score? The answer is clear. No sane team would bid a slam with these cards. Everyone else will be in a comfortable game. I must take whatever risks were necessary to make the bid in order to avoid getting a 0.
  • Which hand should be the master hand? Well, it never hurts to count tricks. There are three or four trump tricks, two or three spade tricks, and two aces. So, I certainly need four tricks in one of the minor suits. After the first trick I have a certain club loser. Therefore, I cannot afford to attack diamonds at all. That means that the dummy, even though it only has three trumps, must be the master hand. It also means that the spade finesse is essential in order to make the contract. I absolutely must have three spade winners in order to discard the dummy’s losing diamonds.
  • Is it necessary to draw trumps? I must concede a club to North (presuming that she did not lead a singleton king). But what if South should ruff in first? If North holds up, and South is able to ruff the third club trick, then I will be set if North started with four hearts. Similarly, if North wins the second trick and then leads another club for South to ruff, I will be set if North started with four hearts. That possibility can be eliminated by taking out two rounds of trump. If both opponents follow, I need not worry about South ruffing in, and if one of them has five trumps, I never had a chance to make it.
  • Which trump should be led? The key is to preserve two entries to dummy. There are two considerations: (1) I must end up in dummy so that I can start on the clubs; (2) I must preserve an entry in trumps. So, a low trump should be led to the hand. The finesse at that point is a 50-50 play, and playing the Ace commits declarer to playing for the drop, which is slightly less than a 50-50 play. So, it is a little better to take the finesse. If it works, a low heart should be led back to the board.
  • If the trumps split three-three, it is clearly safe to start on clubs. At some point North will take the king, or South will ruff in. If North takes the king first, declarer can win any return, draw the remaining trumps with dummy’s queen, and then play on trumps. If South ruffs, North can overruff, return to the dummy with the A, and then resume the clubs. When North takes the king, declarer wins any return, and goes to the board in hearts.
  • If South has four trumps, and North takes his K before South ruffs, he will be caught in a trump coup in clubs as long as declarer has not exhausted his entries. If North has four trumps without the jack, declarer’s only hope is that she has exactly one fewer club than the dummy. In that case, declarer can trump the last club with the ace, and take the last trick with dummy’s Q.

So, the contract fails if North has the Q. If you take the finesse, it fails if North has the J. It also fails if anyone has five or six hearts. If you do not take the finesse in hearts, it fails if either opponent has four hearts. If you do take the finesse, it fails if North has any holding of four hearts and less than four clubs. Not a great slam.

On hands like this one, you can bid poorly and play poorly, and still get a good result. On others you can do everything right, and still get the shaft.

Two Nightmarish Hands

Literally. They kept me up all night. Continue reading

I was up almost all night fretting about two nightmarish hands that led to our downfall in the last round of the Swiss in Johnston. There was actually a third hand that produced equally dire results, but I was the dummy on that one, and it seemed so routine at the time that I paid it little attention.

I was sitting West.


Hand #5 (North dealer, NS vulnerable):

Here was the bidding at our table:

North East South West
Pass Pass 2 2
Double 4 Double Pass
4 Pass Pass Pass

 

The result was one overtrick.

At the other table the bidding was much simpler.

North East South West
Pass Pass 2 Pass
2 Pass 3NT Pass
Pass Pass

This was South’s hand:

A K A K x x A J A J x x

With 24 hcp and a five-card suit, 3NT was not an unreasonable bid. Unfortunately West will invariably lead a diamond, East will play the queen, which forces the ace. West has two entries, and five certain diamond tricks. Even with the monster shown above and North’s five hearts South would be lucky to garner seven tricks in notrump.

So, my aggressive bidding had the unintentional effect of scaring them out of a disastrous notrump contract. On the other hand, if South had bid only 2NT, North would not raise to three. He/she would either pass (only a little better) or bid Stayman or a transfer, which would lead to 4.

Knowing that most experts do not like bidding 2 with a two-suiter, I would have strongly considered bidding only 1 with the South hand. That would surely have forced West’s hand and inevitably led to a heart contract, although maybe we would have stopped short of game. Ideally, it would have gone like this:

North East South West
Pass Pass 1 1
Pass 3 4 Pass
4 Pass Pass Pass

Of course, if North had bid 4, I would not have been happy. I would be forced to retreat to 5. Who knows if North would dare to correct to 5?


The other disastrous hand, board #7, at first appeared to be a fairly interesting play problem.

I held this hand:

A x x x A 10 x K x x x x

I do not remember why I thought that this agglomeration was worthy of an opening bid, but I tabled the 1 card. My partner responded 2NT with the following:

K J x x K 9 x J A K x x x

He did not splinter in diamonds because we play that a splinter shows minimal game-forcing values, and he had more than that. When I rebid 4, he reluctantly passed.

I was delighted when North led the Q, since that almost certainly meant that he had the jack as well. I drew two rounds or trump, which flushed out the queen, took the marked finesse in hearts, conceded a diamond, and claimed twelve tricks.

I should not have been so hasty. I should have begun by leading low to the J. That would have given North the opportunity to play his ace in fear that I might have the KQ. If that did not work, I should have taken two rounds of trump and then tried to set up a long club, which is an 84% play. Only if that failed should I have assumed that North led from the QJ. Of course, it was overwhelmingly likely that he had the jack, but there was no reason to take a chance. The other plays are what Jay Stiefel calls “can’t cost.”

We learned that the opponents with our cards at the other table bid the slam and made it on the lead of the A. How could they know that they had such a magical fit?

They could not have used Losing Trick Count. My hand has eight losers, and partner’s has six. LTC says that we only have ten tricks.

They could not have used Bergen’s adjusted point count. My hand has only 12 declarer points. I probably should not even have opened. Partner’s has 18 dummy points. Even if I add a point for the doubleton in my hand, we are two points short of the 33 that Bergen recommends.

At the other table East used Blackwood and then bid the slam even though she learned that she was off one key card and the queen of trump. She probably did not realize that she was actually missing all four queens and two jacks as well. Aaaargh!

Athens or Sparta?

I’ll take Athens. Continue reading

Just about the most disturbing thing that I have ever heard was broadcast last week on the radio show This American Life, which you can listen to here. A soldier in his early thirties disclosed that, after three tours in Afghanistan, he really regretted not having killed any of the “bad guys” there. He insisted that everyone in the Army knows who has a kill and who doesn’t. He also reported that the training that he received was in large part designed to overcome the innate psychological barrier against taking human life and to turn killing into a goal. He rejected this intellectually, but he still felt a primal and almost irresistible urge of some kind to find out what it was like to kill someone. The urge remained even after he had completed his term of service and returned to civilian life.

What a contrast to my own military experience from October 1970 through April 1972. In those days half of the enlisted men in the Army had been drafted, and a good number of those were college graduates. Most of the rest of the guys had either joined up to escape from some problem in civilian life or had been bamboozled by a recruiting sergeant into thinking that they could get something out of the Army. At the time the country was still mired in Vietnam, but no one whom I knew thought of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese as “the bad guys.” The truly bad guys to us were the government officials who forced us to give up the best years of our lives to this inane institution and the lifers who made the whole thing possible. There certainly were a few fellows who enlisted out of a sense of duty, but in most cases it was a duty that had been inherited from parents and/or siblings who had also been in the military.

Another gigantic difference is the way in which the rest of the country treats the military today. I remember in 2003 as we began our ill-fated invasion of Iraq that nearly every football game on television included a tribute of some kind to the American military personnel. That was almost eleven years ago, and the attitude of the media has hardly changed one iota. On Friday I heard on the radio that veterans can now obtain a special driver’s license or ID card with a flag on it to indicate that they have served in the military. The Secretary of the State went on the air to encourage merchants to offer discounts to anyone who had one because “they have done such a great job.”

I just do not get it. By what conceivable standard has the military done a great job? It is a positive development that soldiers no longer roll grenades into the tents of the commanding officers, or at least the instances of “fragging” are now lumped in with other incidents of “friendly fire.” On the other hand, unless you are a Shiite partisan, Iraq seems no better than it was under Sadaam. Moreover, Al Qaeda is reportedly stronger than ever, and Afghanistan is, well, Afghanistan. The expenditure of hundreds of billions of dollars, thousands of American lives, hundreds of thousands of lives of non-Americans, and untold numbers of physical and emotional casualties has produced absolutely no good at all as far as I can tell. And don’t tell me that the problems remain because we did not have the political will to finish the job. If it takes longer than a decade to accomplish something, you cannot expect the public to keep writing blank checks. Both the Nazis and the Japanese were defeated in far less time. Simultaneously!

It defies credulity how much the American military itself and the citizenry’s attitude toward it has changed in the four decades since I was involved in it. An overriding concern of every male in my generation was the specter of the draft. Some people, including most of the major politicians of the last two decades, took extreme steps to avoid being drafted. Others, including myself, did not try to avoid the draft, but only because we thought that we would probably figure out a way to avoid facing combat.

The enlisted men in the Army were treated like dirt. The starting pay was $125 per month. For that the soldiers were continually subjected to humiliation and mindless labor. I hated every single minute that I was in the Army even though I had one of the cushiest assignments imaginable. The effect on the Army was pernicious. Both the people who did the fighting and the people who supposedly supported them were angry and resentful. Just about the only thing that Donald Rumsfeld and I agree on is his assessment that the American military of the era of the draft was not an effective fighting force.

We have a totally different military today. An astounding 168,000 members of the armed forces are married to other members of the military! In my illustrious military career I met very few people who were married at all. Men who were married with children were exempt from military service, and married people almost never enlisted.* I never encountered a single person who had a spouse in the military.

Everyone in the military is now paid good wages, easily enough to support a family. The troops are provided with a lot more support than we had. I wonder if the drill sergeants even tell recruits about the infamous Jody these days.

The National Guard and the Reserve were a joke in the old days. They helped in emergencies like hurricanes, but mostly they were known as a way for the rich, influential, and the merely lucky to pretend to be in the military. There was never even a suggestion that they might be sent to help out in the war. Now they are deployed in combat almost as often as the regular GI’s.

The Vietnamese War was much more deadly than the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. Over 50,000 American troops perished in Vietnam, more than ten times the number killed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the troops today who kill bad guys using drones and bombs are considered heroes, whereas the poor slobs who got caught in ambushes in the rice paddies were considered … hardly at all.

One thing that the current engagements have in common with the War in Vietname is that they were both based on The Big Lie. In the seventies the lie was known as the Domino Theory, which held that losing in Vietnam would somehow impel other countries to embrace Communism. For many years Americans seemed to buy into this theory, but by the time that I was in the Army hardly anyone of my generation was willing to put his life on the line to hold the line before Communism reached Thailand or Burma.

The lie behind the War on Terror claimed that the troops in Iraq and Afghanistan were somehow preventing terrorists from staging future attacks on the United States. The evidence against it is at least as strong as the evidence against the Domino Theory, but only now, more than a dozen years after it was promulgated, are the people who have served in the military beginning to question whether the invasions were worth the cost. For years it was considered unpatriotic even to mention the cost.

And what of blood lust? I knew a few guys in the Army who were “gung-ho.” They were the subject of widespread ridicule. The sergeants did not try to get us to hate the Viet Cong. One sergeant even told us never to call him Charlie. He said that he deserved the respectful appellation Mr. Charles. What the dedicated sergeants tried to impart on us was how worthless we were and how hopeless their job of trying to train us was. Half of the sergeants, however, were as lackadaisical as we were. They were just counting their own days.

I certainly had no desire to kill anyone. In fact, I mentioned once or twice in Basic Training that I would in no circumstances do it. At the end of our eight weeks of training period one guy came up to me and said that he did not believe me when I said it, but after eight weeks of being with me he changed his mind.

I never changed mine.


* In Basic Training I did meet one very poor guy from Mississippi who sent every paycheck back home to his wife.