Hand #9 provided a good example of how to bid a preemptive hand and how to take advantage of one of bridge's most precious holdings—a trump stack behind another trump stack. We did well at the first aspect, but poorly at the second.
Board #9
North dealer
East-West vulnerable
| | North
♠ K Q 9 5 3 2
♥ A J 7
♦ 10 6 5
♣ 2
| | West
♠ ——
♥ Q 9 8 3
♦ K J 9 8 7 4 3
♣ K 5
| | East
♠ A 10 8 7 4
♥ 10 5 4
♦ A
♣ A J 9 8
| | | South
♠ J 6
♥ K 6 2
♦ Q 2
♣ Q 10 7 6 4 3
| |
|
| | | | |
| South | West | North | East |
| | 2♠ | P |
| P | 3♦ | 3♠ | Dbl |
| P | P | P | |
I sat West. North had the strongest possible weak-two bid in spades, and that is what she—and the other two Norths—bid. I would have done the same if my partnership had good tools for finding the right contract when we have a good fit.
East passed. The temptation to double must be suppressed. Nearly everyone plays double in the direct seat as takeout. West would be forced to bid, and guess what suit he is likely to have.
South has a clear pass. If he had a third spade, he would definitely need to bid 3♠. Note: This is NOT invitational, It is "extending the preempt". The corollary to the LAW of Total Tricks1 advises that in a competitive auction, one should bid to the total number of trumps as soon as possible. North's bid suggests (but at this vulnerability does not promise) six pieces. So the pair has nine trumps, which means that the first player who realizes this should raise to the three level.
Holding West's cards I faced a rather difficult choice. A well-known bridge axiom holds that one does not preempt after a preempt. Would I open this hand at the one-level in the first or second seat? I would think about it; it meets the rule of 20, and it only has five losers. In the balancing seat I felt that I could not sell out to 2♠. So, I bid 3♦.
What about a double? If I doubled, I would expect partner to bid 3♣; my partners always find my worst suit. If yours are more cooperative, go ahead and try it. What then? Unless we were playing Equal-Level Conversions (ELC)2 doubles, a rebid of 3♦ by West (double and correct) would have shown a very strong hand, not a distributional nine-count. This is a recipe for trouble. I would have liked to show my hearts, but our agreements did not provide a way.
Apparently the other two Wests made the same decision. At our table and one of the others North made a rebid that I would NEVER consider: 3♠. When one preempts, the captaincy is surrendered to the responder. He/she can give it back, but the opener's seizing of it violates the principles of preempting and is also insulting to the responder.
This time my partner correctly reached for the axe, and the final contract was 3♠ doubled. Before doubling East should think about how the hand might play. The singleton ♦A is screaming to be led, but what next?
When the dummy comes down, good players start counting. The dummy has two spades, which leaves none for West. The dummy has only two diamonds, an indication that (under the assumption that West had fewer than eight) declarer must have at least three. That is definitely good news. It is doubtful that West has more than four hearts, which leaves North with at least three. So, North has at most one club: probably 6-3-3-1 or 6-3-4-0. North should not have more than ten points, which leaves West with at least nine.
The top priority for East should be to make good use of those five beautiful spades. That means playing all five after North does. So, a trump lead is definitely out. The second priority is to avoid setting up South's club suit. So, I would have led a heart. My partner led the ♣A, which was OK.
I played the ♦9 on the first trick to indicate possession of the king. East's third lead was a heart.
To my dismay declarer took three hearts and then led a diamond, which I won, leaving dummy with none. I led ♣K, which declarer ruffed. She then led her last diamond toward dummy's two spades. East played the ♠7, therby reducing her own spade holding without affecting North's. That was a very bad play. Then, when she finally got in East led a spade. That only made matters worse. She should have realized that North had nothing but spades in her hand. There was no reason to waste a precious trump when the club suit had no conceivable value at that point.
In the end we set the contract, but only by one trick. That won us only 100 points, which was not as good as either of the other East-West pairs. However, if we had scored even one additional trick, we would have garnered 300 points and beaten both of them.
1. The LAW states that in a competitive auction the total number of tricks available to the two sides in their best suits is roughly equal to the number of trumps they hold in those suits. This conclusion is supported by reams of data. What I call the "corollary" recommends that you should bid to the number of the trumps held by your side as quickly as possible. This conclusion was dependent upon the scoring system used in bridge. In fact, the current scoring method has only been in effect since 1987. Reliance on the corollary should be tempered by the vulnerability, at least somewhat. Since North-South have favorable vulnerability on this hand, almost all good players would employ the corollary.
2. Making a takeout double and then bidding again ordinarily promises a hand with the equivalent of 17 high-card points. The ELC double carves out one exception. If the opponent had opened a major suit, and partner then advanced the double by bidding clubs, a rebid of diamonds by the doubler would NOT promise extra values. The ELC double could have been used by West in this instance: double followed by 3♣ converted to 3♦. A very imaginative East might have recognized the possibility of a magical fit and bid 3NT, by far the best contract available.