I went home after this week's session in a miserable funk. I had been up—off and on—since 4AM. I played a session at the Hartford Bridge Club in the morning. I then had some errands to run that left little time to prepare for the evening session in Simsbury. In the twenty-four hands that we played, I was only the declarer once, and I messed it up. The thing that really darkened my mood, however, was the auction on Hand #13.
Board #13
North dealer
Both sides vulnerable
| | North
♠ A 3
♥ J 9 3 2
♦ 8
♣ J 10 9 7 4 3
| | West
♠ K J 8 5 4 2
♥ A 10 8
♦ 9
♣ K 8 5
| | East
♠ Q 10 9 6
♥ K 7 5
♦ A 10 6 3
♣ Q 2
| | | South
♠ 7
♥ Q 6 4
♦ K Q J 7 5 4 2
♣ A 6
| |
|
| | | | |
| South | West | North | East |
| | P | P |
| 1♦ | 1♠ | Dbl | 2♦ |
| 3♦ | 4♠ | P | P |
| 5♦ | P | P | P |
I was sitting East. North's double was, of course, negative. It showed four hearts. Her hand was near the lower end of the point requirement. There is no limit on the strength. My 2♦ bid showed at least invitational values and support for spades. What would a redouble have meant?1 I don't think that Ken and I had ever discussed it. We certainly play no convention that covers the situation. A reasonable expectation is that it shows invitational values without support. Ken went to game. South was proud of his diamond suit and bid 5♦.
Two passes followed. I thought for a few seconds and then passed.
I don't remember my reasoning process, if any, but before Ken could lead I regretted that I had not doubled.
The right way to look at this is simple. After doing a quick assessment that the relative strength of each side is probably within the 17-23 point range, one should count trump—ours in spades, theirs in diamonds. I knew that my partner had at least five, probably six, conceivably more. In fact, he had six, which gave us ten. The opponents could have no more than nine, and that assumes that my partner had a void. In fact, they only had eight.
So, there were only eighteen trumps, which is about what I could have guessed. If the opponents could really take eleven tricks, then we could take seven. Was it conceivable that Ken could have bid as he did with any hand that would only take seven tricks opposite my hand? I think not.
I definitely should have doubled. If I was too tired to go through the simple mental calculations, I still should have doubled because of one tried and true bridge maxim: "The five level belongs to the opponents."
If I was too tired to remember that, I still should have doubled just to put more pressure on the opponent.
It is even arguable that Ken's pass was forcing. If I had been in his position, I would have expected my partner to take action—either to double or, much less likely, bid 5♠.
This was one of the worst bidding decisions that I have made in years. I often tell people that most of my best calls were green, that is, using the pass card. In this case passing was just ignominious and indefensible.
1. A lengthy discussion of the possibilities can be found here.