I had one memorable moment in Wednesday's game. It came upon our first hand, which was board #2 (we shared boards with table 5). I was sitting North. Ken and I had a very scientific auction that left us in a 6NT contract that I got to play. When the dummy came down, I calculated the probability of making it at about 15 percent. However, everything worked, and I claimed after ten tricks.
If you look at your scorecard, you will probably not believe this story. That is because at the time that I made the claim East had four cards, and there were only two left in the dummy. So, we had to shuffle the cards and redeal the hand.
There were several contenders for the low point of our round, but the winner was probably the last hand that we played, board #21. I held 4=4=2=3 distribution and a solid 16 high-card points, and so I wasted no time in placing the 1NT card on the table. Unfortunately, we were playing a weak 1NT, and my partner correctly passed with ten hcp. So, we missed an easy game.
The hand that really annoyed me, however, was this one:
Board #15
South dealer
North-South vulnerable
| | North
♠ A Q 6
♥ K 4
♦ 10 9 6 4
♣ A J 8 3
| | West
♠ 10 7 4 2
♥ Q 10
♦ A Q J
♣ Q 10 9 6
| | East
♠ J 9 8
♥ 6 3
♦ K 5 3 2
♣ K 5 4 2
| | | South
♠ K 5 3
♥ A J 9 8 7 5 2
♦ 8 7
♣ 7
| |
|
South opened 3♥. I had a good hand, but was it good enough to raise? I knew that Ken would not preempt with a pile of junk at unfavorable vulnerability. I racked my brain to try to think of some way to evaluate whether I had a good enough hand to raise to game. I fervently wished that there was a way for me to find out something – anything! – about his hand, but there was no bidding room available.
I did remember the Rule of 17, but that only applies to weak two bids. Besides, I only had sixteen. Those four diamonds persuaded me to pass. Two of them indeed turned out to be losers, but Ken had a singleton club and the ♠K. When the ♥Q fell on the second trick, he gobbled up eleven tricks.
Perhaps I should have thought back to my days working with the middle-school kids in Springfield. We taught them to use the principle of 2-3-4 when preempting. This rule says that with favorable vulnerability you can preempt if you expect to be four tricks short of making it in your hand alone. At equal vulnerability you can be three short, and at unfavorable vulnerability you must be within two. Then your partner estimates how many tricks he/she can add and bids accordingly.
Of course, this rule only works if both players on the same page. In general, we are more aggressive than most at preempting, but not at this vulnerability. I think that I could have applied it. South's hand has seven losers, which leaves him three tricks short of his contracted amount. At unfavorable vulnerability the 2-3-4 rule requires one fewer loser, but it is hard for me to imagine that anyone in the twenty-first century would bid only 2♥ with South's hand or, heaven forfend, pass.
What about my hand? I clearly have a minimum of three tricks to add. The ♠Q is worth half of a trick. The ♣J is worth something, and, if South is missing the ♥Q, My second heart provides a reasonable chance of subtracting a loser in hearts by dropping the queen. Thus, it would have been reasonable for me to raise.
My reasoning was not far from this, but I expected South to have the ♥A and ♥Q and less outside. I realized that if he had the ♠K, 4♥ was probably cold, but I thought that the chances of that were very slim. After all, he promised seven hearts, and the opponents had only four between them. So, I chickened out.